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Light Thoughts and Night Thoughts
on the American Family
Judith T. Younger*
I take my theme today from two recent events--one from
art and one from life. The artistic event happened last Labor
Day. Blondie Bumstead, wife of Dagwood, mother of Cookie
and Alexander, and mistress of Daisy, the family dog, made a
startling announcement. In the two thousand newspapers and
fifty-five languages in which her comic strip appears,' she told
her readers that she was worn out from cooking and cleaning
and was thinking of getting a job.2 After considering a number
of possibilities, Blondie did, in fact, go to work-in her own ca-
tering business. 3 She has thus joined the increasing number of
real mothers entering the paid labor force in search of a supple-
ment to the family income and a measure of independence and
equality which they did not enjoy as housewives.
Like her real life counterparts, Blondie was responding, al-
beit belatedly, to the early message of the women's movement.
The message was critical of the then prevailing family ideology
which told people to marry young, have several children, and
define themselves "first and foremost" as "homemakers" if
they were female and as "breadwinners" if they were male.4
As Betty Freidan put it in 1963 in her book, The Feminine Mys-
tique:5 Women should have fulfillment outside their homes;
they should not have to sacrifice education and careers just be-
cause they marry and have children.6 Women could and should
* Joseph E. Wargo Anoka County Bar Association Professor of Family
Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Professor Younger delivered this
inaugural chair lecture on November 6, 1991.
1. Blonde Ambition, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 1, 1991, at E7.
2. E.g., Blondie, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRm., Sept. 2, 1991, at E5.
3. Ellen Goodman, Work-world tips for Blondie, MINNEAPOLIS STAR
TRM., Sept. 10, 1991, at A14.
4. Elaine Tyler May, Myths and Realities of the American Family, in A
HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: RIDDLES OF IDENTITY IN MODERN TIMES 539, 581
(Antoine Prost & Gorard Vincent eds., Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1991).
5. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
6. Id at 338-78.
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escape domesticity by a combination of self-help and legal re-
form. They should join men in the workplace while inviting
men to share power with them at home. At the same time,
they should urge repeal of laws shoring up the traditional fam-
ily and casting spouses in sex-based roles. This program, if fol-
lowed, would yield the ideal: happy individuals in egalitarian
families. Women responded. They went to work in droves.
The proportion of mothers with children under age six who
were working or looking for work outside the home rose from
thirty-two percent in 1970 to fifty-eight percent in 1990.7 There
are now about 10.9 million children under six years old who
have mothers in the paid labor force, including 1.7 million ba-
bies under one year of age and 9.2 million toddlers and
preschoolers.8 Mothers of school-age children are even more
likely to be working. In 1990, more than seventy-four percent
of women whose youngest child was between six and thirteen
years old were working or looking for paid work.9 Approxi-
mately 17.4 million children-more than sixty-five percent of
all children in that six to thirteen year old age group-had
working mothers in 1990.10 Among employed mothers, nearly
seventy percent whose youngest child is under six and more
than seventy-four percent whose youngest child is school-age
work full-time."
Courts and legislatures responded to the Freidan message
as well. They effected substantial reforms. Laws which shored
up the traditional family by casting husbands as breadwinners,
obligated to support their wives and children, and wives as eco-
nomic dependents and providers of domestic services virtually
disappeared from the books.12 Marriage began to look more
like a partnership than a patriarchy. Husbands and wives are
now cast as equals, obligated to support each other 3 and their
7. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, FINAL REPORT, BEYOND RHmo-
Ric: A NEw AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 21 (1991) [here-
inafter COMMISSION REPORT].
8. Id. at 21-22.
9. Id at 22.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 459-61 (1981) (striking
down a statute that gave a husband the unilateral right to dispose of commu-
nity property without his wife's consent); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279-80
(1979) (stating that statutes that make gender-based classifications resting
upon outdated concepts of the proper roles of husband (breadwinner) and wife
(homemaker) are invalid).
13. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 32 (McKinney 1988).
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children.14 They can dissolve their marital partnerships with-
out a showing of fault,' 5 and, on dissolution, each is entitled to
a return of contribution in the form of an equitable 16 or equal17
share of the family's community or marital assets, depending
on the jurisdiction. What is more, if spouses do not like any of
these incidents of the marital regime they have a good deal of
freedom to change them by making their own contracts.' 8
Thus, Blondie is not alone in the work world, nor is her
conduct inconsistent with the law's current view of what wo-
men should do. We will, nevertheless, have to wait to see how
she likes her new role and what effect it has on her family.
Many women before her have been gravely disappointed: be-
cause they received lower pay than male coworkers; because
they had fewer opportunities for advancement than men; be-
cause they were in lower-paying, female-segregated occupa-
tions; because although they were working they were still
responsible for household chores, child- and dog-care; because
they did not have the institutional supports, such as daycare
and family leave, that other industrialized western nations pro-
vide for working mothers;19 because when their need for flexi-
bility impelled them, like Blondie, to become owners of their
own small businesses, they lost the benefits of working for
someone else-vacations, pensions, and health insurance, for
example.20 Some women had second thoughts and retreated
into their old roles. Many divorced, and along with an increas-
ing number of mothers who never married their children's fa-
thers, became heads of poor, single-parent families.21
I do not mean to be harsh with, or pessimistic about,
Blondie or her real-life counterparts because I have followed
14. Id
15. See Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty
States: An Overview, 24 FAM. L.Q. 309, 328-29, tbl. I (1991).
16. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1992); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(c)-
(d) (McKinney 1986).
17. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West 1992); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 159
(West 1992).
18. Eg., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2331 (West 1985); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 236 B(3) (McKinney 1986).
19. See generally SYLviA A. HEwLETr, A LESSER LIFE: THE MYTH OF WO-
MEN'S LIBERATION IN AMERICA 91-100 (1986) (comparing United States mater-
nity leave and child care policies to those of other industrialized nations).
20. See Goodman, supra note 3, at A14.
21. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 24. The Commission noted
that "[c]hildren living only with their mothers are especially likely to be poor.
Approximately 43 percent of mother-only families are poor, compared to only
about 7 percent of two-parent families." I&.
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the same path. My oldest daughter was born in the year The
Feminine Mystique was published. I read it and, accordingly,
did not waste a single day at home with the baby. I have been
in the work force ever since, preaching about the importance
for women of law reform, of equality, of independence, and of
egalitarian families. In a colossal act of denial, or perhaps be-
cause I was too busy or too tired to do it, I never examined my
own family or my status in it. It dawned on me, as I worked on
this talk, that, despite my job, I was neither equal with, nor in-
dependent of, my husband. Nor was my family egalitarian; it
was patriarchal. But it was stable.
This brings me, in a roundabout way, to the second event
that provides my theme for this talk-the one from life. It hap-
pened a few weeks before Blondie made her announcement.
The bipartisan National Commission on Children issued its fi-
nal report. The report, optimistically entitled "Beyond Rheto-
ric," is a sleek, 519-page document, replete with photographs
and tables. It is remarkable for its unanimous conclusion that
the nation's children are in trouble-increasingly at risk from
poverty, suicide, drugs, risky sex, dropping out of school, and
family violence.2 What American children need but do not
have, it seems, are stable families,2 and what the natidn needs,
but does not have, is a national policy which encourages their
formation.25
Both Blondie's announcement and the Commission Report
received lots of news coverage, but none of the commentators
made what I think is an obvious connection between the two.
As American women, and particularly mothers, have joined the
work force, thus gaining a greater measure of equality and in-
dependence, American families have declined, losing stability
and strength.
To see what has happened we need only look around us.
Today, only twenty-two percent of married couple households
22. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7.
23. See id at vii-viii (chairman's preface). In the first two chapters of its
report, the Commission describes the changing American family and links the
changes, including the increase in single-parent families, to the troubles facing
American children. Id at 3-37. In chapter nine, the Commission says
"[r]esearch on the effects of single parenthood confirms that children who
grow up without the support and personal involvement of both parents are
more vulnerable to problems throughout childhood and into their adult lives."
Id at 251.
24. IH at 251-55.
25. Id at xic-xx.
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have a male breadwinner and a female homemaker.2 In 1960
the figure was sixty-one percent.27 Men are contributing less to
family finances and women are contributing more.2s The effect
on the family is an increase in the number of divorces and sin-
gle-parent families.2 If they are working, unmarried -mothers
have less incentive to marry the fathers of their children and
married women have less incentive to stay in their marriages.30
As women's earnings increase both husbands and wives report
less satisfaction with their marriages,3' and change in the rela-
tive economic position of spouses is a prime factor in many
cases of divorce.32 Similarly, remarriages are more likely to fail
when both partners have economic resources.3 Sadly, people
who can support themselves and their children have less need
to depend on one another.
It is significant, I think, that in Sweden, where women lead
the world in terms of their economic independence from and
equality with men, the family is in a similar decline.3 A very
high percentage of working-age Swedish women are in the la-
bor force;S a very small percentage of Swedish women are full-
time housewives. 36 The gap between men's and women's earn-
ings is very small-only ten percent.37 In other words, Swedish
women earn ninety percent as much as Swedish men. The
comparable figure in the United States is just under seventy
26. Martha Farnsworth Riche, The Future of the Family, AMERICAN
DEMOGRAPHICS, Mar. 1991, at 44.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. I&
33. Id.
34. DAvID POPENOE, DISTURBING THE NEST FAMILY CHANGE AND DE_
CLINE IN MODERN SOCIETIES 187-258 (1988) (discussing the decline of the Swed-
ish family as an institution); David Popenoe, Family Decline in the Swedish
Welfare State, 102 THE PUB. INTEREST 65 (1991) [hereinafter Popenoe, Family
Decline] (arguing that Sweden's status as a welfare state has contributed to
the decline of the Swedish family). See generally Kristina Orfali, The Rise and
Fall of the Swedish Model, in A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: RIDDLEs OF IDEN-
TrTY IN MODERN TIMES 417, 426-32 (Antoine Prost & GCrard Vincent eds., Ar-
thur Goldhammer trans., 1991) (discussing Swedish family mores).
35. See Popenoe, Family Decline, supra note 34, at 71 (stating 77%, one of
the highest percentages of working-age women in the labor force of any West-
ern nation).
36. Id. (stating 10%, "probably the smallest percentage... of any Western
nation").
37. Id. at 72.
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percent 3s-a thirty percent gap. The family in Sweden is ex-
hibiting the same unhealthy symptoms as is the family in the
United States. As in the United States, people marry less fre-
quently39 and dissolve their relationships more frequently;4°
children are more often raised by a single parent;41 and families
do fewer things together.4 Swedish children are not as poor as
American children only because the Swedish welfare state foots
the bill, but the signs of trouble are there. Juvenile delin-
quency is up and depression, alcoholism, and suicide are in-
creasing.43 A welfare state, it seems, is just as dangerous to
families as is a market economy.
"So what?" you may ask. If the family is so fragile that it
cannot thrive in either a market economy or a welfare state,
why worry about it? We can always assign the child-raising
task to strangers instead of parents. This suggestion has been
made often enough by sociologists" and feminists45 and, indeed,
has been tried-notably in the Israeli kibbutzim of the sixties.4
Not only child-raising but all traditionally female work was
communalized. 47 Kibbutzim had communal kitchens, commu-
nal laundries and communal babies' houses where a profes-
sional provided most of the care.4 The idea was to take the
burdens out of being a woman.49 In the second generation of
kibbutzim, when the number of women in the kibbutz popula-
38. Helaine Olen, Wage Equity Concept Wanes as Women Slowly Close
Pay Gap, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1991, at A5; see also Mary Kane, Women Nar-
row Wage Gap, But They Still Trail Men, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRiB., Oct. 6,
1991, at J1 (stating also that the earnings gap is larger than the wage gap (wo-
men earn 78% of men's hourly wages and 75% of men's average weekly earn-
ings) because women tend to work fewer hours per year than men).
39. See Popenoe, Family Decline, supra note 34, at 66 (stating that Swe-
den has the lowest marriage rate of any industrialized nation).
40. Id at 75.
41. Id
42. Id
43. Id. at 76.
44. E.g., Kingsley Davis, The American Family in Relation to Demo-
graphic Change, in 1 THE COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE
AMERICAN FuTuRE REsEARCH REPORTS 241 (1972).
45. E.g., GERMAINE GREER, THE FEMALE EUNUCH 231-33 (1971) (hypothe-
sizing "an organic family" in a "farmhouse in Italy" worked "by a local fam-
ily," and that the real parents could come and go and children "need not
know" who their "womb-motherts]" were).
46. LIONEL TIGER & JOSEPH SHEPHER, WOMEN IN THE KIBBUTZ 26-33
(1975).
47. Id. at 29-30.
48. Id.
49. Id- at 30.
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tion had become about equal with the number of men, women
began to resist this way of living.50 They wanted more time
with their children and a return to traditional family life.51 By
the 1970s, marriage and family were central.5 2 The kibbutz ex-
periment in child-raising failed because women did not like it.s3
In any event, current wisdom warns against such a reassign-
ment of responsibility.
The National Center for Health Statistics reports that chil-
dren's troubles are tied to their living arrangements; children
who live with both natural parents have fewer emotional
problems and less academic difficulties than others s4 As Urie
Bronfenbrenner, my former colleague at Cornell University,
would probably explain this, such children do better than
others because they have two parents with whom they have de-
veloped "strong, mutual, irrational emotional attachment and
who [are] committed to the [children's] well-being and develop-
ment . . . for life."' s The National Commission on Children
agrees and gingerly endorses the two-married-parent nuclear
family as the most hospitable environment for childrenss This
is a brave but politically difficult position in view of the grow-
ing number of single-parent, step-parent, unmarried cohabiting
heterosexual and homosexual, and polygamous families.5 7 To
say that the two-married-parent family is good is bound to
make other families feel bad and, understandably, the Commis-
sion does not follow through with its endorsement. Its recom-
mendations apply to all families, regardless of structure.
Foremost among the recommendations is that Congress enact a
tax credit of $1000 per child.58 If a family had no tax liability it
would receive the amount in cash.59 The Commission's goal,
50. Id. at 226-27.
51. I&
52. Id.
53. Id
54. Nicholas Zill & Charlotte A. Schoenborn, Develpmenta4 Learning,
and Emotional Problems, ADVANCE DATA (FROM VITAL AND HEALTH STATIS-
TIcs OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTIcs), Nov. 16, 1990, at 8.
55. Urie Bronfenbrenner, What Do Families Do?, FAMILY AFFAIRS (INsTi-
TUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES), Winter-Spring 1991, at 2.
56. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at xix, 66, 255.
57. Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Func-
tional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1640,
1640 (1991); see also Dirk Johnson, Polygamists Emerge from Secrecy, Seeking
Not Just Peace but Respect, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1991, at A8.
58. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at xxi, 94-95.
59. Id. at 95.
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namely, to alleviate the poverty of families with children,60 is
laudable, but there is no guarantee, of course, that a family re-
ceiving the credit would spend its extra dollars on its children.
Moreover, the credit's universal application to all families, two-
parent, one-parent, stable or not, might encourage the wrong
people to have children for the wrong reasons. A more direct
approach would be to use tax policy in an affirmative way to
give preferential treatment to the two-married-parent family so
that people would choose it over other living arrangements.
61
The Commission did not come up with such a plan but did rec-
ognize that some provisions of tax law, including the marriage
penalty, cut against the establishment and continuation of sta-
ble families. It therefore recommended repeal.62
Aside from these alterations in tax policy, is there anything
else the law might do to encourage the formation and continua-
tion of stable families for raising children? I thinlZ so, but
before I get to it let me provide reassurance about two things.
First, I do not think that women should abandon the workplace
and go back home to domestic endeavors; nor should they give
up the benefits they have gained from the women's movement
or success in the work force. I think what we need, rather, is
heightened individual and societal awareness of some sad facts
of life. Raising children makes the primary caretaker, or care-
takers, dependent-dependent on family, strangers, or govern-
ment, or some combination of the three for however long it
takes the children to grow up. Moreover, a cultural emphasis
on self-fulfillment inhibits the creation of stable families. To
people who are interested in self-fulfillment, personal interests
come first; to people who are concerned with family stability,
the interests of the family as a unit are primary. If, as it seems,
children need stable families, people whose main interest is
self-fulfillment should not have children. In other words, I am
suggesting more responsible parenthood by both women and
men. Personally I do not care who is responsible for child-care
within any particular family. The ideal may be that the task is
60. Id. at 93.
61. See, e.g., Allan Carlson, A Pro-Family Income Tax, 94 THE PUB. INTER-
FsT 69, 70 (1989) (stating that people respond to tax incentives which are in-
tended to promote families).
62. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 255. The Commission recognizes
that certain tax policies, notably the "marriage penalty" under which "a mar-
ried couple pays higher taxes than two single adults with the same income
who live together," id at 252, discourage individuals from marrying and con-
tribute to divorce. Id at 252-53.
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shared, although my experience tells me that is rarely the case.
I think women do and will probably continue to do more child
care than men for a number of reasons-because they like it,
because they are better at it, because they have the instinct
built in,63 and because our culture expects them to do it.64 If I
am right, responsible parenthood is even more important for
women because when things go wrong they are likely to face
the child-raising task alone. That is a risk any woman who gets
pregnant or who adopts a child must be prepared to accept.
The second reassurance I want to give has to do with the
law's ability to make people responsible parents. I am as skep-
tical about that as anybody. People generally ignore the law
when they make living arrangements and become aware of it
only when those arrangements fall apart. Nevertheless, the
law should try to influence people to stay in their families until
their children are grown. One of the law's most important
functions is to act as a teacher.65 When the law teaches, of
course, it ought to teach the right lesson. The right lesson is
that marriage and parenthood are not suitable activities for eve-
ryone but are only for those who are willing to sacrifice per-
sonal interests to familial interests for the time necessary to
raise their children. The lesson now embodied in the law is just
the opposite. The Supreme Court has lodged both the right to
marry6 and the right to procreate 67 squarely in the Constitu-
tion and labelled them "fundamental rights." The implication
is that both are essential to happiness, that both are suitable ac-
tivities for everyone to engage in, and that life without either is
63. See Christine Gorman, Sizing Up The Sexes, TIME, Jan. 20, 1992, at 42
passim.
64. See Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault New Directions in Divorce Re-
form, in DIvoRcE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 6, 30 (Stephen D. Sugarman &
Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
65. As Edmond Cahn, one of my great law school teachers, explained:
In ancient days, there was a vision that appeared almost simultane-
ously to the best minds of the Hellenic and Hebraic worlds. Great
sages voiced the hope that the law could serve as a pedagogue to the
people, instructing them in the maxims of enlightenment, righteous-
ness, and self-rule. No less than the Psalmist in the Bible, Plato and
Aristotle believed that the law should be employed as a "lamp unto
the feet and a light unto the path."
EDMOND CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION 5 (1955).
66. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
67. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see also Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (holding that married and unmarried individ-
uals entitled to same access to contraceptives); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 (strik-
ing down a statute forbidding the use of contraceptives).
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wanting. Constitutionalizing these activities helps to strip away
the selectivity people should and might otherwise display
before deciding to marry or procreate. State law completes this
misleading lesson by allowing parents of minor children to di-
vorce without any inquiry into the effect the divorce is likely to
have on the children.68 The message is that personal interests
of the parents take precedence over those of the family. One
obvious method of correction would be to deconstitutionalize
both the right to marry and the right to procreate, leaving the
states freer to experiment with methods of encouraging respon-
sible parenthood. Because this would endanger related funda-
mental rights, notably the right to abortion,69 I do not suggest
it.
A better, more direct approach would be to change state
law to create what I call "the marriage for the benefit of minor
children." This would be a special status for people who have
or who want to have children. Couples could choose it as one
available form of marriage. In addition, the law would impose
the status on all families with minor children, whatever the
sexes of the adults and whether they were actually married or
not, so long as they were engaged in what I call "married con-
duct." This is a modification of a proposal I made in a very long
law review article ten years ago.70 Then it appealed only to me;
now the basic idea is picking up a little support.71 Although it
has not been enacted by any state legislature, I still believe in
the concept.
The "marriage for the benefit of minor children," whether
chosen or imposed, would be the antithesis of what most mod-
ern marriages have become-nothing more than vehicles for
self-fulfillment of the spouses. The special marriage status, on
the other hand, would be designed, as far as the law can accom-
plish such a purpose, to encourage living arrangements which
are good for raising children. It would differ from other mar-
68. See Freed & Walker, supra note 15, at 328-29 (listing by table the
grounds for divorce in every state).
69. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
70. Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and De-
moralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 45, 90 (1981).
71. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 256; Elizabeth S. Scott, Ra-
tional Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 90-91
(1990); Second Thoughts on Divorce, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 1991, at 23, 23-
24.
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riages in two major respects: the grounds for divorce and the
rules governing the roles and duties of family members.
Before I discuss these two ways in which the "marriage for
the benefit of minor children" differs from other marriages, let
me address for a moment, the implications of imposing the sta-
tus on all families in which there are minor children and the
content of "married conduct." First, I realize that imposing this
status on same-sex couples who are not now permitted to
marry, heterosexual unmarried cohabiting couples, and polyga-
mous families, would legitimate them. I suggest it with that in-
tention. These groups now form "a permanent and influential
subculture outside the law," adding to the "insecurity and insta-
bility" of American family life.72 The law should legitimate
them.
Second, the "marriage for the benefit of minor children"
would attach only to those families who had minor children
and who were engaged in "married conduct." Its reach, there-
fore, would be narrower than that of common law marriage,
which applies to childless couples as well as to those with mi-
nor and adult children. Common law marriage, of course, has a
consensual aspect, not so clearly present in the imposed "mar-
riage for the benefit of minor children." To be declared com-
mon law spouses, parties must prove an agreement to enter
into the relationship. 73 The consensual aspect of the imposed
"marriage for the benefit of minor children," on the other
hand, is negative; it lies in the opportunity to avoid the status
by refraining from bearing or adopting children or engaging in
married conduct.7 4
Proving the agreement to marry in common law marriage
72. Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1980, at 83, 97.
73. See In Re Estate of Dallman, 228 N.W.2d 187, 189 (Iowa 1975); Estate
of Gavula, 417 A.2d 168, 171 (Pa. 1980).
74. It might be argued that, under current constitutional doctrine, impos-
ing this status on people who have not voluntarily chosen it just because they
have children and are engaged in married conduct may be an impermissible
infringement of the fundamental rights to marry and procreate. My hope
would be that the courts, in assessing the validity of the proposal, would find
that the state's compelling interest in assuring the emotional and financial
well-being of minor children justifies this invasion of the liberty interest in
choosing to marry or procreate. If not, I would have to take a fall-back posi-
tion. Instead of imposing the status on those who didn't choose it, we could
make the status so attractive that few could refuse it-by offering tax benefits
or other incentives for entering it. Such legislation would be constitutionally
permissible because, in the language of Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), it
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cases too often boils down to a "swearing match"75 between the
parties. To avoid that, the test of what constitutes married con-
duct and thus a "marriage for the benefit of minor children" is
objective, and, therefore susceptible of more reliable proof.
First, the family must have a common life together of substan-
tial duration. The very fact that a family had children would
be some evidence of their common life. Second, during their
common life together the family members must have exhibited
commitment to each other-attitudes of mutual obligation,
assistance, and support. My idea here is to exclude casual living
arrangements-affairs as opposed to truly committed relation-
ships. Third, during their common life together the family
must have lived as an economic unit, exhibiting financial inter-
dependence. I would want to confine this status to family
members who support and are supported by each other, and
who thus need its protection. The three elements can be
proven by testimony from the family's friends, coworkers, land-
lords, neighbors, doctors, and dentists, and by documents such
as the family's banking and other financial records.
I now return to the differences between the "marriage for
the benefit of minor children" and current law. Under current
law parents of minor children can divorce without any inquiry
into the effects of the divorce on the children. By contrast, in
order to divorce during the minority of their children, the
would merely encourage "alternative activity deemed in the public interest,"
i& at 315, rather than infringe upon fundamental liberties.
The "marriage for the benefit of minor children" is even less vulnerable
to an equal protection attack. The Equal Protection Clause protects against
statutory discrimination through unreasonable, arbitrary classifications. Legal
distinctions between families with minor children, whether their parents are
married or not, and families without minor children are already embedded in
the law. Families with minor children have to support and educate their chil-
dren and are subject to greater risk of state intrusion into their privacy on be-
half of the children. They also may enjoy benefits that others do not have
based on their childrens' dependency: income tax deductions and draft defer-
ments, for example. Families with minor children are not a suspect class and
strict judicial scrutiny does not apply to legislation regulating them. Even if
they could be considered a suspect class, the state's long-term compelling in-
terest in protecting the welfare of minors should be enough to sustain the leg-
islation, including the more onerous divorce standard and an immutable trust
relationship, discussed infra notes 82-111. Under a rational basis test, the
more stringent divorce standard and the immutable trust relationship are
surely rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of assuring
the well-being of dependent, minor children, and are as well tailored to that
goal as are current laws imposing support and other parental obligations.
75. Johnson v. Green, 309 S.E.2d 362, 364 (Ga. 1983) (Weltner, J.,
concurring).
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adults in the "marriage for the benefit of minor children"
would have to establish two things: that continuing the mar-
riage would cause one or more of them exceptional hardship
and that continuing the marriage would harm their children
more than divorce. I see the new divorce grounds as raising a
presumption that no divorce should be granted to parents of
minor children during the children's minority. To rebut the
presumption, a parent or parents who want a divorce would
have to convince the trial court, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that continuing the marriage would cause one or both of
them exceptional hardship and would harm the children more
than divorce.
In determining exceptional hardship, a trial court would fo-
cus on past acts and facts, examining the relationship between
the parents and their physical and emotional well-being and
ability to function during the marriage. In assessing harm to
the children, however, the court would have to predict, on the
basis of the past, what is likely to happen to the children in the
future, just as it does in determining a child's best interests in
disputed custody cases. The "harm" inquiry, however, is nar-
rower than that for "best interests." 76 It is linked to only two
events: continuing or ending the marriage. In making this in-
quiry, a court would consider both the short- and long-term ef-
fects of each alternative on the children. The court would draw
on general studies77 about parents and children, as well as indi-
vidualized ones on the particular parents and children. It
would consider the nature of each child and its relationship
with each parent. In addition, it would consider the parents'
ability to place the children's needs before their own, communi-
cate with each other, share decisions, and minimize any bad ef-
fects of the tensions between them on the children in a
continued marriage and after divorce. In the unlikely event
that a parent or parents made out exceptional hardship in con-
tinuing the marriage and a court found the interests of the chil-
dren divided-that is, that continuing the marriage would harm
some, but not all, of the children more than divorce, a simple
head count could resolve the matter. The court, in such a case,
should decide in favor of the greatest good for the greatest
76. For a typical list of factors the courts consider in assessing the "best
interests" of children, see MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 1 (1990).
77. For some of these and their conclusions, see Barbara Kantrowitz et al.,
Breaking the Divorce Cycle, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 13, 1992, at 48, 49.
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number of family members, including parents as well as
children.
As I see it, proof that a spouse or spouses in a "marriage
for the benefit of minor children" abused each other or the
children should satisfy the new grounds. To continue such re-
lationships would not only cause spouses exceptional hardship
either from being abused or witnessing the other abusing the
children but would harm the children more than divorce even
if the children themselves were not the subjects of abuse. Such
abusive families fail to perform the all important function of
providing children with a permanent sense of well-being and
the lasting emotional security to make healthy adults. By this
failure they perpetrate their own destructiveness to succeeding
generations-children who grow up in abusive familes are
likely to be abusive in turn. Thus, such familes should be al-
lowed to dissolve.
The new divorce grounds would have two functions, one
deterrent and one remedial. The new grounds would discour-
age people from engaging in uncommitted marriage or procrea-
tion by sounding a warning that the law considers both very
serious business. They would encourage those already married
and already parents to settle their differences in the interests
of their children, but would not continue marriages in which
parental discord damages the children more than divorce.
Courts would be able to explore the likely effects of divorce on
children, an inquiry they do not make under current law, and
children's interests would become a crucial factor in deciding
parents' rights to divorce.
At a time when "private ordering"-that is the notion that
divorcing parents should be free to negotiate their own ar-
rangements-is in fashion,78 it may seem anomalous to suggest
that courts take on this expanded role. What justifies it is the
sad fact that family breakdown is bad for children. This is a
modest attempt to save them. Courts are already deciding what
custody arrangements are in the best interests of children after
divorce when parents cannot agree,79 and are rubber-stamping
78. See Robert H. Mnookin et al., Private Ordering Revisited: What Cus-
todial Arrangements Are Parents Negotiating?, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE
CROSSROADS, supra note 64, at 37, 37; Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Korn-
hauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE
L.J. 950, 950 (1979); Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agree-
ments, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1059, 1060 (1988).
79. See Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Func-
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agreed-upon parental custody arrangements.8 0 It would be bet-
ter to involve the court earlier in both contested and uncon-
tested divorce proceedings while there is still a status quo to
preserve. If the court is not convinced that a parent or parents
have made out the more stringent divorce grounds, it then has
a fallback position available-that is, to continue the marriage.
In these cases, minor children may need independent represen-
tation, especially if both parents want to divorce. The courts
should, therefore, be empowered to provide it.,,
The second way in which the "marriage for the benefit of
minor children" would differ from other relationships is in the
rules governing the roles and duties of family members. Cur-
rently the law treats spouses like partners.8 2 It entrusts child-
raising to parents and protects their privacy in performing it as
a fundamental constitutional right83 As to expected parental
performance, it says only three things: support your children,84
send them to school,85 and do not abuse them.8 6 When I first
proposed the "marriage for the benefit of minor children" I
thought that the partnership model, virtual parental autonomy
with respect to children, and the more difficult divorce grounds
for leaving the status would be adequate to fix the parameters
of family behavior. I have now changed my mind. Based on
principles of contract, the partnership model works well for
tions in the Face of Indeterminacy, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at
226, 226-27.
80. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 78, at 951.
81. For a discussion of representation of children in child-custody dis-
putes, see Veazey v. Veazey, 560 P.2d 382, 385-90 (Alaska 1977) (describing the
role of one representing a child in a child-custody case); Mnookin, supra note
79, at 254-55.
82. Bea A. Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solu-
tion Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689, 696 & n.39 (1990).
83. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
84. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:74 (West 1986) (making it a crime to
refuse to support one's minor child or spouse if the means to do so are avail-
able); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.05 (McKinney 1989) (making it a crime for a par-
ent or legal guardian to refuse to support a child under age 16 without a lawful
excuse).
85. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:221 (West Supp. 1992) (imposing a"
fine of not more than $15 per day on parents who prevent their child from at-
tending school); N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3212(2)(b) (McKinney 1981) (imposing a
duty on those in a "parental relation" to a child to compel the child's attend-
ance in school).
86. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(C)(1) (West Supp. 1992) (re-
quiring certain persons responsible for the care of a child, such as medical
workers, who suspect child abuse to report the abuse to the state so that pro-
tective proceedings may be initiated).
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parties of equal strength and independence. People like Don-
ald and Ivana Trump, perhaps, can handle it. In the course of
their courtship and marriage, the Trumps signed four or more
agreements,8 7 each negotiated by their attorneys and each en-
hancing Ivana's position. The Trumps, of course, are not an or-
dinary couple. Ordinary couples are less equal, and ordinary
parents are less trustworthy than current law assumes.
Instead of treating spouses as equal partners capable of
continually renegotiating their roles in a marriage-long bargain-
ing session, and leaving parents to care for minor children with
so little guidance, the law should recognize the inequality and
dependence of family members and the inadequacies of parents.
It should take a less permissive, more protective attitude to-
ward them. What I am suggesting is that in "marriages for the
benefit of minor children" the law should treat the adults as
trustees for the benefit of each other and for their children. In
other words, I would put the 500-year-old common law trust,
the "greatest and most distinctive achievement performed by
Englishmen in the field of jurisprudence,"'8 to work for the
American family. Frederic W. Maitland tells us in The Unin-
corporate Body, one of his collected papers, that "[f]irst and last
the trust has been a most powerful instrument of social experi-
mentation. ' '8 9 Historically, the trust has acted by prodding the
legislature and forcing it to change the law.9° There is no rea-
son why legislatures have to follow this historic pattern. In-
stead of lagging behind, they can take the offensive by picking
up the trust and sending it forth on a new social experiment-
an attempt to shape and stabilize our floundering families. This
trust by operation of statute9 ' would be immutable and would
apply to all dealings between or among family members until
87. Raoul L. Felder, Look Out Donald, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 19, 1990, at 9.
88. Frederic W. Maitland, The Unincorporate Body, in 3 THE COLLECTED
PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 271, 272 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911).
89. Id. at 278.
90. Maitland gives us:
some well-known instances:-It (in effect) enabled the landowner to
devise his land by will until at length the legislature had to give way,
though not until a rebellion had been caused and crushed. It (in ef-
fect) enabled a married woman to have property that was all her own
until at length the legislature had to give way. It (in effect) enabled
men to form joint stock companies with limited liability, until at
length the legislature had to give way.
Id. at 278-79.
91. For a discussion of trusts by operation of statute, see Judith T.
Younger, Trusts by Operation of Statute, 25 REC. OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF N.Y. 407 (1970).
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the children were grown. By that I mean that family members
could not contract to opt out of or limit the common law rules
which would apply to them as trustees and trust beneficiaries. 92
Moreover, on divorce, a court could order continuation of the
trust relationship between ex-spouses and children, delaying
termination and ultimate property distribution until the chil-
dren are grown.93
I should tell you that, like it or not, venerable common law
trust principles are already edging into family law. I detect
them in three places. First, they are appearing in proceedings
involving distribution or division of marital or community as-
sets as couples divorce. Typically in these cases, one spouse ac-
cuses the other of misconduct with regard to marital or
community assets. Enabling statutes in some jurisdictions per-
mit courts to use equitable principles to protect spouses from
such misconduct by their mates. In Minnesota, for example,
the Legislature has made spouses fiduciaries with respect to
each other for profit or loss from the use of marital assets with-
out the other's consent in contemplation of commencing or dur-
ing the pendency of a divorce, annulment, or separation
action.4 Similarly, in making equitable distribution of marital
assets on divorce, the New York Legislature has directed the
courts to consider both any wasteful dissipation of assets by a
spouse during the marriage9 5 and "any transfer or encum-
brance [of assets] made in contemplation of a matrimonial ac-
tion without fair consideration."9 6 Both Arizona and California
92. See 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIB.
STEIN ON PARTNERSHIP app. A § 21, at 103 (Supp. 1989) (stating that partners
are fiduciaries with respect to the partnership but can change their fiduciary
duties by contract). Some jurisdictions now recognize spouses as fiduciaries
for the benefit of each other, but only for limited purposes. See, e.g., Elkaim v.
Elkaim, 574 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding certain assets in con-
structive trust to benefit the wife when husband attempted to place marital
property beyond wife's reach); Charlton v. Charlton, 1991 WL 258812, at *5 (W.
Va. Dec. 6, 1991) ("In the domestic relations area, we have recognized that
there exists a fiduciary relationship between husband and wife with regard to
dealing with each other's property."). But see Zack Co. v. Sims, 438 N.E.2d
663, 674 (IlM. App. Ct. 1982) ('"e marital status alone does not establish a fi-
duciary relationship.").
93. Currently, courts have continuing power to modify child support and
maintenance awards on the basis of changed circumstances, see UNIF. MAR-
RIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 316(a), 9A U.L.A. 489-90 (1987), but beyond this,
the courts' power to make economic adjustments ends on divorce.
94. M-N. STAT. § 518.58, subd. la (Supp. 1992).
95. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(d)(11) (McKinney 1986).
96. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(d)(12) (McKinney 1986); see also
Louis Becker, Conduct of a Spouse that Dissipates Property Available for Eq-
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allow courts, in dividing community property, to consider "ab-
normal expenditures, destruction, concealment or fraudulent
disposition of assets. '97
Second, trust notions are emerging in custody and other
cases involving children. For example, in 1991 the Florida
Supreme Court upheld an order treating the custodial mother
as if she were a trustee of the children's feelings for the benefit
of the noncustodial father.9 8 The trial court found that the cus-
todial mother "breached every duty she owed as the custodial
parent to the noncustodial parent of instilling love, respect and
feeling in the children for their father."99 It ordered her "to do
everything in her power to create in the minds of [the children]
a loving, caring feeling toward the father... [and] to convince
the children that it is the mother's desire that they see their fa-
ther and love their father."10 ° If the mother breached her duty
again, the court warned, it "would result in the severest penal-
ties .... including contempt, imprisonment, loss of residential
custody or any combination thereof."10 1 In two other cases, one
from California 10 2 and one from New York,10 3 courts treated
mothers as if they were trustees of the children's physical well-
being, ordering the mothers to refrain from smoking in the
children's presence because it was detrimental to the children's
health.1 4
Third, courts are actually imposing constructive trusts on
spouses or their estates to effect justice in a variety of situa-
tions. A recent example comes from New Jersey. In Carr v.
Carr,105 Mr. Carr left his wife after seventeen years of mar-
uitable Property Distribution: A Suggested Analysis, 52 OIo ST. L.J. 95
(1991).
97. Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (b)(2)
(West 1983 & Supp. 1992).
98. Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So. 2d 1290, 1292-93 (Fla. 1991).
99. I1d at 1292.
100. Id
101. Id.
102. DeBeni Souza v. Kallweit, 16 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1496 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1990).
103. Roofeh v. Roofeh, 525 N.Y.S.2d 765, 769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
104. Courts similarly take into account parents' smoking habits in custody
and visitation cases. Albert Momjian & Natalie Finkelman, When Custodial
Rights Go Up In Smoke, MATRiMONIAL STRATEGIST, Dec. 1991, at 3.
105. 576 A.2d 872 (N.J. 1990). For other examples of courts imposing con-
structive trusts on spouses, see Scull v. Scull, 462 N.Y.S.2d 890, 893 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1983), aff'd, 493 N.E.2d 238 (N.Y. 1986); Tidball v. Tidball, 463 N.Y.S.2d
287 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
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riage.106 Mrs. Carr sued for divorce but Mr. Carr died during
the pendency of the action. 0 7 Mrs. Carr faced an unusual di-
lemma. She was not entitled to an elective share of Mr. Carr's
estate under the applicable New Jersey statute because she and
he were not living together at the time of his death. 0 8 Neither
was she entitled to an equitable distribution of marital assets
because Mr. Carr's death ended the divorce proceeding. 0 9 The
court came to her rescue by imposing a constructive trust on
marital property which was under the control of Mr. Carr's ex-
ecutor.110 The court acted "in order to ensure that one party
has not been unjustly enriched, and the other unjustly impov-
erished, on account of their dealings."'111
Suppose the Minnesota Legislature adopted the new status,
the "marriage for the benefit of minor children," with different
divorce grounds during the children's minority and the immu-
table trustee-beneficiary relationship among family members.
Would it make a difference and, if so, how? Take three much
discussed Minnesota decisions for examples. All three involved
married couples with children. Two arose in the context of di-
vorce; one arose in an ongoing marriage.
First, consider McKee-Johnson v. Johnson.1"2 The issue in
that case was whether the couple's antenuptial agreement
could be enforced against the wife on divorce."3- To enforce it
would mean she would take no share of marital assets." 4 Each
spouse was well educated and engaged in an established in-
dependent career." 5 In the "marriage for the benefit of minor
children," even if the couple could have established their enti-
tlement to divorce, they would not have been able to contract
out of their trustee-beneficiary relationship by either antenup-
tial or postnuptial agreement; their antenuptial agreement
would therefore have been invalid. As trustee, the husband
106. Car'r, 576 A.2d at 874.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 875.
109. Id.
110. I& at 880.
111. Id
112. 444 N.W.2d 259 (Minn. 1989).
113. Id at 261.
114. Id. at 262.
115. Id at 261. Lance Johnson was a lawyer undergoing a career change
from private practice to a career with an emphasis on real estate development
and investment. Id Mary McKee-Johnson earned B.S. and M.S. degrees in
nursing and was a director of nursing programs at two community colleges.
Id. Her duties as an administrator required that she have familiarity with con-
tracts and similar business documents. Id
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would have had the immutable fiduciary duty to make the fam-
ily assets productive for his wife and child. The only possible
questions to litigate would have been whether to defer termina-
tion of the trust relationship and division of marital property to
the child's majority and, if division was to be immediate, what
would be the exact amount of the wife's share. After a great
deal of judicial effort the Johnson case was correctly decided," 6
but the task would have been much easier if the "marriage for
the benefit of minor children" had been in effect.
Next, consider Maxfield v. Maxfzeld,117 a custody dispute
between divorced parents. The trial court awarded custody of
the four children to the father.118 The Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals reversed, awarding custody of the three youngest children
to the mother and remanding the issue of the oldest child's cus-
tody to the trial court for redetermination." 9 The Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed. 2 0 It did so despite Mrs. Maxfield's
less than exemplary conduct.' 2 ' Before the divorce, she took
the children from Minnesota to Pennsylvania, telling her hus-
band, who contributed to the airfare, that it was just for a
visit.'2 2 In fact, she did not intend to come back.m When she
and the children arrived in Pennsylvania, she tried to cut off all
contact with the father.124 In the "marriage for the benefit of
minor children," Mrs. Maxfield's actions would have been con-
sidered a breach of her fiduciary duty as a trustee. The breach
would have precluded an award of custody to her and kept the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from reaching what I
think were wrong decisions.
The third case is Minnesota v. McKown.1s In McKown,
116. The trial court and intermediate appellate court held the antenuptial
agreement invalid because it dealt with marital property. McKee-Johnson v.
Johnson, 429 N.W.2d 689, 692-94 (Minn. App. 1988), rev'd, 444 N.W.2d 259
(Minn. 1989). The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed, holding that Mr.
Johnson had proved the procedural fairness of the agreement at the agree-
ment's inception. 444 N.W.2d at 266. The Supreme Court remanded for a re-
view of the substantive fairness of the agreement at inception and
enforcement. Id- at 268.
117. 452 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. 1990).
118. Id. at 219.
119. Id,
120. Id
121. See id. at 223 (stating that conduct denying contact with children
could not be condoned).
122. Id, at 219-20.
123. Id at 220.
124. Id
125. 475 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 1991).
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parents who were Christian Scientists failed to provide medical
treatment for their son.126 As a result, the child died of diabe-
tes.' 7 In their defense against an indictment for second degree
manslaughter, the parents relied on the Minnesota child ne-
glect statute'2 which says that if a parent, in good faith, selects
prayer for treatment of a child, the prayer constitutes health
care.1m The parents argued that because of this statute they
did not have fair notice of the possibility that their actions
could result in criminal prosecution.130  The Minnesota
Supreme Court agreed.131 The parents' personal interests-
their religious beliefs-were thus allowed to override the inter-
ests of the child and the family. Had the "marriage for the ben-
efit of minor children" been the law of Minnesota, the parents
would have been trustees for the child's benefit and their fail-
ure to provide medical care would have been a clear breach of
their fiduciary duties. In view of their breach, the Minnesota
Supreme Court would have been hard pressed to conclude
either that the parents acted in good faith or that they did not
have fair notice of the possible consequences of their actions.
My next suggestion is aimed directly at discouraging single-
parent families.132 What I am suggesting has nothing to do
with the law. It is rather a sales effort-a national advertising
126. Id- at 64.
127. I.
128. M INN. STAT. § 609.378 (1988).
129. McKown, 475 N.W.2d at 67.
130. 1& at 65.
131. Id- at 68-69.
132. One strictly legal approach to this problem would be to reform the
welfare system's penalties for work and marriage. The National Commission
on Children was very critical of the welfare system, saying:
In almost all cases under current law, a low-income mother receiving
AFDC and related welfare benefits would pay a substantial penalty if
she married a man working in a minimum wage job (especially if his
employer does not provide health insurance). Even if her prospective
new husband earns $15,000 annually and receives health benefits from
his employer, their marriage would cause a substantial income de-
cline. In effect, the low-income couple who choose to marry are also
forced to choose a much less secure life for their children.
Of even greater concern is the fact that AFDC typically pays
more to a family abandoned by the father than it does to one whose
father remains at home and provides some or all of the necessary sup-
port. As a consequence, many low-income fathers leave their families
and are discouraged from assuming financial responsibility for their
children. The Commission concurs with many critics who have con-
cluded that U.S. welfare policy often unwittingly undermines the for-
mation and maintenance of stable nuclear families.
COMMSSION REPORT, supa note 7, at 91-92.
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or educational campaign, if you prefer. In the United States,
advertising successfully sells cars, credit cards, Coke and Pepsi
Cola, deodorants, hair-sprays, frankfurters, shampoos, as well
as a host of other products. Advertising taught the American
public to smoke cigarettes; now it has taught them to stop
smoking. Why not employ advertising to convince more Ameri-
cans to be more responsible parents or in the alternative not to
have children?133 The message would be simple: Enjoy sex, of
course, but do not have children without marrying and making
the commitment to stay married until the children grow up. I
am put in mind of Aldous Huxley's novel, Island,134 about a
country in which the government distributes contraceptives
and teaches its children this very lesson. Instead of calling it
"responsible parenthood," Islanders call it "the yoga of love."' a 5
All children learn it and remember it when they grow up.'3
Of course, Island is a utopian novel about a utopian society, but
it could happen here and it should.
Another aspect of Huxley's utopian society bears copying.
The Islanders all belong to MACs, that is an acronym for Mu-
tual Adoption Clubs. 137 Every MAC consists of from fifteen to
twenty-five assorted couples.'-9 As described by one of Hux-
ley's characters:
Newly elected brides and bridegrooms, old timers with growing chil-
dren, grandparents and great-grandparents-everybody in the club
adopts everyone else. Besides our own blood relations, we all have
our quota of deputy mothers, deputy fathers, deputy aunts and uncles,
deputy brothers and sisters, deputy babies and toddlers and teen-
agers.
13 9
MACs operate to give children additional parents and the par-
ents additional children.14° The idea is to give children and
adults a greater degree of freedom instead of locking them into
single nuclear families.141 Children can leave home and go to
deputy parents or grandparents in their MAC.'4 Frazzled par-
ents can have new, more satisfactory children for a while or
133. This sort of a campaign has been waged before. Examples are C. Ev-
erett Koop's efforts against smoking and AIDS. See C. EVERErr KOOP, THE
MEMOIRS OF AmERICA'S FAMILY DOCTOR (1991).
134. ALDOus HUXLEY, ISLAND (Perennial Classic ed. 1972) (1962).
135. This is also called "maithuna." Id at 75.
136. Id at 78.
137. Id at 89.
138. Id
139. Id-
140. Id at 90.
141. Id at 90-91.
142. Id- at 89, 92.
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take a complete respite from children while seeking advice
from other parents in their MAC.14 s
Perhaps this is an idea whose time has come, and it brings
me to my last suggestion. The law should recognize the possi-
bility that a child might have more than one mother and one
father. Certainly the notion of more than one set of parents
per child has to be taken seriously in light of modern technol-
ogy. It is now possible for two women to have a biological con-
nection with a child-one can furnish the ovum and another
can furnish the womb. The law could, but does not, recognize
them both as mothers.144 Similarly, the law should recognize
that more than one father is possible. Although to date only
one man can have a biological connection with each child,
others can be presumed fathers, either because of a relationship
like marriage with the child's mother or a relationship with the
child.' 45 Only Louisiana accepts the possibility of dual pater-
nity, recognizing both the biological and the presumed father.
In Smith v. ColeA46 the Louisiana Supreme Court allowed a
child who had a presumed father to bring suit to establish an-
other man as her biological father. 47 The law is exclusive
143. I& at 92. The National Commission on Children recognizes the impor-
tance of this kind of help for families. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7,
at 255.
144. See, eg., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156, 158 (Michie Supp. 1991) (effective
July 1, 1993) (deeming gestational mother to be child's mother regardless of
biological connection to child, unless valid surrogacy agreement exists); see
also Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (surrogate
mother held not to be natural or legal mother), review granted, 822 P.2d 1317
(Cal. 1992). But see In re L.S. and V.L. for Adoption of Minors (T.) and (L.),
Adoption Nos. A-269-90 and A-269-90 (Super. Ct. D.C., Fam. Div., 1991), re-
printed in WALTER WADLINGTON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DOm=ESTC
RELATIONS 100 (Supp. 1992). In IS. and V.L, two women shared a household
with two children. One child was the biological child of one woman and the
other child was the adopted child of the other woman. I& at 100-01. The court
allowed each woman to adopt the other's child, id. at 104, so, while in a sense,
each child had two mothers, there were only two parents in the family.
145. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 (1989) (holding that a Cali-
fornia law creating a presumption that a child born to a married woman living
with her husband is a child of the marriage did not violate due process rights
of man claiming to be father); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4, 9B U.L.A.
298-99 (1973).
146. 553 So. 2d 847 (La. 1989).
147. The court said.
In summary, Louisiana law may provide the presumption that the
husband of the mother is the legal father of her child while it recog-
nizes a biological father's actual paternity. . . . A filiation action
brought on behalf of the child, then, merely establishes the biological
fact of paternity.... [I]t does not bastardize the child.
Id- at 854-55.
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everywhere else, limiting each child to only one father. Instead
of excluding all but one each of these potential mothers and fa-
thers, the law might do better to recognize all in the interests
of both parents and children. The more willing hands there are
to perform a difficult task, the more likely it is to be done.148
Ultimately, when the scientists succeed in creating a full-term
baby by ectogenesis (that is, completely outside the womb), a
development which I am told is just around the corner, there
will be a whole new group of potential parents to share the
child-raising task-the lab technicians and others who partici-
pated in the birth.
A national family policy embodied in federal and state
laws, teaching the lessons of responsible parenthood, would be
148. This explains the success of polygamous families. A female member
of one such family, who happens to be a lawyer, recently described the advan-
tages of life in a polygamous family for both parents and children. Here is
what she said:
I married a married man.
In fact, he had six wives when I married him 17 years ago. Today
he has nine....
Polygamy, or plural marriage, as practiced by my family is a para-
dox. At first blush, it sounds like the ideal situation for the man and
an oppressive one for the women. For me, the opposite is true. While
polygamists believe that the Old Testament mandates the practice of
plural marriage, compelling social reasons make the life style attrac-
tive to the modem career woman....
When I leave for the 60-mile commute to court at 7 am., my 2-
year-old daughter London is happily asleep in the bed of my hus-
band's wife, Diane. London adores Diane. When London awakes,
about the time I'm arriving at the courthouse, she is surrounded by
family members who are as familiar to her as the toys in her nursery.
Elizabeth Joseph, My Husband's Nine Wives, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1991, at
A31.
The author goes on to explain that she lives in a house with another wife.
Most nights they have a simple dinner with their children. On Mondays their
husband eats with them. The wives make appointments with their husband
when they want private time with him.
In sum, she says:
Plural marriage ... is the lifestyle for me .... It offers men the
chance to escape from the traditional, confining roles that often iso-
late them from the surrounding world. More important, it enables
women, who live in a society full of obstacles, to fully meet their ca-
reer, mothering, and marriage obligations. Polygamy provides a
whole solution. I believe American women would have invented it if
it didn't already exist.
Id.; see also David Sarasohn, Two-income Families May Need to Take the Next
Step: Polygamy, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 2, 1991, at A13. This is differ-
ent from the original child-care structure in the Israeli kibbutzim. See supra
notes 46-53 and accompanying text. Child-care in the polygamous family is the
responsibility of family members; in the early Kibbutzim, child-care was per-
formed by strangers.
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comforting at least and helpful at most in attempting to solve
the problems of American families. Competing interests among
different families and between parents and children in individ-
ual families may make it impossible to forge a coherent na-
tional policy.149 Even if it could be done, policy is not a
panacea. There is no substitute for individual responsibility in
matters of love, marriage, and family.15°
149. GILBERT Y. STEINER, THE FUTILITY OF FAMILY PoLicY 214 (1981).
150. On these topics no one surpasses the English poet, Philip Larkin. Of
"love" he says:
Not love you? Dear, I'd pay ten quid for you:
Five down, and five when I get rid of you.
Of "marriage" he says:
My wife and I-we're pals. Marriage is fun.
Yes: two can live as stupidly as one.
PHILIP LARKIN, COLLECTED PoEms xxi, xxii (Anthony Thwaite ed., 1988). For
Larkin's views on "family," see This Be The Verse, in LARKIN, supra, at 180.

